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ABSTRACT
Authors summarized major causes of current financial crisis in EU on global and re-
gional (European) level. On a global level these are credit rating agencies and compensa-
tions of CEO directors in financial sector. On regional level these are structural imbalance, 
increasing debts of EU countries, foreign trade imbalance among EU countries and loss of 
confidence in debt of EU countries. Measures for preventing future crises in EU according to 
the authors are improved debt management, application of Keynesian ideas for overcom-
ing the crisis, reform of the criteria for entering the Eurozone, creation of a fiscal union, exit 
of the PIIGS countries from the Eurozone, taxation of the financial sector and creation of a 
banking union.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the years before the crisis economic movements in the European Union 
were favorable. According to the Eurostat, unemployment rate was declining while 
inflation rate measured by harmonized consumer indices was low and stable. Also, 
in political sphere certain successes were achieved. In 2004. European Union wel-
comed ten new member states which was the biggest enlargement in the history of 
EU (Mintas Hodak, 2010). 
European Union was achieving moderate economic growth until the world fi-
nancial crisis in 2008. Unemployment rate was declining in the years before the cri-
sis, form 9.3% to 7%. The inflation rate measured by the harmonized index of con-
sumer prices was low and stable. European Union was achieving moderate economic 
growth, which was stopped with the start of the world financial crisis of 2008. This 
data is shown in the following table.
Table 1.: Movement of economic indicators in eu in pre-crisis period
Economic 
indicator 2004. 2005. 2006. 2007. 2008.
Unemployment 
rate (in %) 9.3 9.0 8.2 7.2 7.0
HICP1 (change 




4.38 3.70 4.08 4.56 4.55
GDP growth rate 
(in %) 2.6 2.2 3.4 3.2 0.4
Source: Authors’ own design according to data by Eurostat.
Global financial crisis hit PIIGS countries especially hard1 (Sarangi, 2014). A 
major economic recession started in 2009. in European countries. The starting 
point of that economic crisis was the subprime crisis in the US (Weill, 2014). 
However, causes that led to the crisis in the EU were various and numerous. The 
aim of this paper is to give an overview of causes which generated crisis in the EU and 
measures that can be applied for preventing future crises in the EU. 
This paper has three parts. First part deals generally with crises while authors 
emphasize world financial crisis of 2008. It is an introduction to the core of the pa-
per. Second part gives an overview of external and internal causes that generated cri-
sis in the EU. Third part gives measures for overcoming and preventing future crises 
in the EU.
1  Due to the economic recession which started in 2008, several members of the European Union became 
known as PIIGS. These states include Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain and if combined 
together, they form the acronym PIIGS. The reason why these countries were grouped together is the 
substantial instability of their economies, which was an evident problem in 2009.
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2. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS OF 2008
Financial crisis represents a disturbance in financial system that is accompa-
nied by a decline in the value of assets and insolvency of many firms in financial and 
other sectors. Generally, it has negative impact on economy. There is no consensus 
among the economists for the crucial causes and methods for solving the crises. So, 
they continue to occur (Benić, 2012).
World financial crisis was generated by the crisis of the real estate market in 
the USA, popularly called “subprime crisis”. During the period from 1997. to 2006. 
prices of the real estate were growing to unrealistic levels, until 2007. when started 
their sharp decline (Figure 1.).
Figure 1.: U.S. housing price index since 1900
Source: Observations, 2014.
During that period an increasing number of debtors weren’t able to pay back 
their loans because of high interest rates and low incomes. Suddenly, high supply of 
houses appeared on the market and because of that came a sharp decline of prices. 
Insolvency of the debtors led banks to losses. Banks that had given the loans couldn’t 
sell the houses so the consequence was the crash of the entire financial system. Cri-
sis spread all over the banking system, insurance sector, stock exchanges and funds 
(Ribinak, 2011).
The hardest moment for the financial sector happened in the middle of 2008. 
when banks Lehman Brothers, Bearn Sterns and biggest real estate firms Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac went bankrupt (Steele, 2014). Bankruptcy of the Lehman Brothers 
was especially heavy shock for USA residents because of it’s long tradition and be-
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cause it was an icon of American banking system. The main cause of bankruptcy were 
very high managerial compensations that were given for short term successes. By 
giving loans for houses to debtors who weren’t able to pay back their loans, managers 
generated the crisis which had grown to the economic crisis (Bebchuk et al., 2009). 
Samuelson and Nordhaus (2007) state that the cause of financial crises is reces-
sion2 whose features are: 
• Reduced demand for products and services which leads to the increase of 
stock. It causes reduced production and consequently reduced GDP and in-
vestment.
• Reduced profit of the companies, stock prices, demand for credits and inter-
est rates.
• Decrease in demand for labor and higher unemployment rate.
• Decrease of inflation rate because of reduced demand for products and ser-
vices.
Financial crisis and recession that had officially finished in USA in 2009. just 
started in Europe. From USA crisis spread to the European Union through European 
banks which had bought financial products from American banks with AAA+ ratings 
(Kowalski, Shachmurove, 2014).
3. CAUSES OF FINANCIAL CRISIS IN EU
Authors summarized major causes of current financial crises in EU on global 
and regional (European) level. On a global level these are credit rating agencies 
and compensations of CEO directors in financial sector. On regional level these are 
structural imbalance, increasing debts of EU countries, foreign trade imbalance 
among EU countries and loss of confidence in debt of EU countries. Further in the 
text, authors give an overview of each cause.
Credit rating agencies
From their establishment, credit rating agencies became a very important fac-
tor in financial markets. Published ratings of companies and governments have 
long-term consequences because of the interconnection of national economies on 
macroeconomic and relationships between financial sector and real sector on mi-
croeconomic level.
Thus, credit rating agencies should inform the potential investors about the 
credit risk of the securities issuers. That kind of information should be based on 
objective and independent estimation about possibility of issuer to repay the debt. 
2  Period of general economic decline; typically defined as a decline in GDP for two or more 
consecutive quarters. 
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Three largest agencies for credit ratings are Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s Investors 
and Fitch Rating (Host et al., 2012).
In the period before the crisis, credit rating agencies haven’t given realistic rat-
ings of EU countries which later faced the crisis. From 2003. to May 2010. Fitch Rat-
ing evaluated Spain with AAA3 credit rating, in spite of Spain’s problems with high 
unemployment and low economic growth in the observed period.
With it’s ratings, the agencies haven’t signalized the beginning of the Greek 
crisis and also crises in the rest of the European Union. Ratings for each countries 
haven’t taken into account that, in spite of structural economic differences, the 
economies of the European countries are strongly interconnected.
Agencies haven’t predicted that the crisis will spread from one country to the 
entire Eurozone. Only after 2009. have the agencies reduced credit ratings of coun-
tries affected by the financial crisis (Tichy, 2012). Negative impact of the credit rat-
ing agencies can be best seen on the example of Greece. Until 2009. Greece’s credit 
rating was positive - agencies haven’t taken into account the problems of Greece’s 
public finances (Host et al., 2012).
Indications about Greek financial problems started to become obvious in Janu-
ary 2009. when Standard & Poor’s reduced it’s rating from A to A-. Then, in 2010. 
Moody’s reduced Greece’s rating by four levels, from A3 to Ba1 until 2011. when it 
reduced Greece’s rating to Caa (Regional today, 2014).
Compensations of CEO directors in financial sector
Irresponsible corporative governance played a significant role in creation and 
development of contemporary financial crisis. Corporative governance of banks dif-
fers from other companies because they give higher incentives not only to executive 
directors but also to managers on lower corporative levels (Štefulić and Peša, 2012).
One of the major generators of the crisis were managerial compensations. Man-
agers had been rewarded with high bonuses for their short-term performances with-
out taking into account the risk that they can generate (Webinger, 2011). Hakenes 
and Schnabel (2014) state that if managers are rewarded with high bonuses for their 
short-term performances without imposing the limits to the risk they can create, 
that can be very dangerous for the long-term viability of the bank (Hakenes and Sch-
nabel, 2014). Table 1. shows the amounts of bonuses that have been paid to managers 
in Wall Street and City of London.
3  The highest credit rating
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Table 2.: Total bonus payouts in city of london and wall street from 2001. to 2009.
Year Wall Street Bonuses  $ billion










Source: Mathews and Mathews (2010).
Level of bonuses before the crisis was raising constantly (except in 2002. in Wall 
Street). Bonuses should be paid on the basis of achieved success and not as a reward 
for bringing the bank to the brink of bankruptcy (Štefulić and Peša, 2012).
The financial crisis of 2007. has put the compensation structure of the banks at 
the forefront of many policy debates on the root causes of the banking crisis (Mur-
phy, 2009). The positive relationship between bank CEO compensation and risk 
taking is a well established empirical fact. The global banking crisis has resulted in 
numerous demands to control banker’s bonuses and thereby curtail their risk-tak-
ing activities in the hope that the world can avoid repeating the same mistakes in the 
future (Mathew and Mathew, 2009).
Structural imbalance in Eurozone
Macroeconomic difficulties in the EU are largely caused by structural imbalance 
in Eurozone which prevents macroeconomic stability. Prerequisite for the macro-
economic stability in Eurozone is a real cooperation among EU countries which cur-
rently doesn’t exist (Razin, Rosefielde, 2012).
Good example for that is the lack of mobility of the workforce within the EU. 
EU members are fiercely protecting jobs in their country. Because of that, there is a 
huge problem with high number of unemployed persons in countries such as Greece, 
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain that can’t be eased by permanent or temporal mi-
gration of workforce to Germany or other developed countries of EU. Furthermore, 
there are no institutionalized requirements according to which the richer member 
countries should help poorer ones, as it exists in the USA (Kersan Škabić, 2012).
Eurozone countries faced restrictions and structural imbalance during the cri-
sis. When it was useful to devalue their own national currency they weren’t able to 
do that. Countries whose prices had become uncompetitive couldn’t independently 
devalue the euro or get out of excessive debt by printing euros. Instead of that, they 
70
REVIEW OF INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS VOLUME 1  |  ISSUE 1  |  2015
had to rely on internal devaluation by reducing wages and prices, goodwill of domes-
tic and foreign creditors and fiscal help from richer EU members (Razin, Rosefielde, 
2012).
The problem that the Eurozone is facing is a consequence of “impossible trin-
ity”. Ideal currency would enable the achievement of all three goals: monetary in-
dependence, exchange rate stability and complete financial integration. Impossible 
trinity represents the fact that a country can achieve only two of the three goals due to 
the effects of economic forces (Kersan Škabić, 2012).
Increasing debts of EU countries
In 1992. members of the EU signed the Maastricht Treaty according to which 
they pledged to restrict budget deficit and public debt. Maastricht Treaty de-
creased credit risk and with the elimination of currency risk had an impact on 
reducing the borrowing costs for the state members. However, some countries in 
1992. already had their public debt higher than 60 percent of GDP (Badurina et 
al., 2012:77).
Some member states, including Greece and Italy found ways to bypass these 
rules. That enabled these states to cover the level of their deficit and debt by combin-
ing techniques which include inconsistent accounting and the use of complex de-
rivatives (Simković, 2009).
Adoption of euro as a currency by different member states has led to very low 
interest rates on government bonds in a period before the crisis, which encouraged 
personal and government spending. Table 2. shows the movement of public debt by 
selected EU member states.
Table 3.: Movement of the public debt for selected eu member states from 2005. to 2013. (in %)
State 2005. 2006. 2007. 2008. 2009. 2010. 2011. 2012. 2013.
Germany 66.8 66.3 63.5 64.9 72.4 80.3 77.6 79.0 76.9
France 67.0 64.2 64.2 67.8 78.8 81.5 85.0 89.2 92.2
Netherlands 49.4 44.9 42.7 54.8 56.5 59.0 61.3 66.5 68.6
Portugal 67.4 69.2 68.4 71.7 83.6 96.2 111.1 124.8 128.0
Ireland 26.2 23.8 24.0 42.6 62.2 87.4 111.1 121.7 123.3
Greece : 103.4 103.1 109.3 126.8 146.0 171.3 156.9 174.9
Spain 42.3 38.9 35.5 39.4 52.7 50.1 69.2 84.4 92.1
Source: Authors’ own design according to data by Eurostat.
It’s obvious that observed countries have increased their public debt from 2005. 
to 2013. 
Sovereign debt crises have been recurrent events over the past two centuries. 
More recently, sovereign debt crises have been increasingly linked to the banking 
sector (Reinhart, Rogoff, 2009).
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European sovereign debt crisis is a period of time in which several European 
countries faced the collapse of financial institutions, high government debt and rap-
idly rising bond yield  spreads of government securities. The European sovereign 
debt crisis started in 2008, with the collapse of Iceland’s banking system, and spread 
primarily to Greece, Ireland and Portugal during 2009. The debt crisis led to a crisis 
of confidence for European businesses and economies. 
There are three ways in which the euro is connected to the European sovereign 
debt crisis. First, the initial institutional design of the Eurozone plausibly increased 
fiscal risks during the pre-crisis period. Second, once the crisis occurred, these de-
sign flaws amplified the fiscal impact of the crisis dynamics through multiple chan-
nels. Third, the restrictions imposed by monetary union also shape the duration and 
tempo of the anticipated post-crisis recovery period, along with Europe’s chaotic po-
litical response and failure to have institutions in place for crisis management (Lane, 
2012:50).
Foreign trade imbalance among EU countries
The foreign trade surplus of Germany grew in the period after 1999., while the 
deficits of Italy, Greece and Spain have worsened. That relationship is shown by Fig-
ure 2.
Figure 2.: Foreign trade balance of eu members from 1995. to 2012.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, 2014.
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Giday (2013) states that foreign trade deficit demands appropriate capital inflow 
for it’s financing. Thus, in a period before the crisis, capital inflow created the illu-
sion of wealth in these countries, as was the case in the United States. Asset prices 
were rising, currencies were strong but bubbles always burst sooner or later. 
Foreign trade deficit can be caused by changes in the relative costs of labor. That 
led to the fact that the southern states have become less competitive and increased 
trade imbalances. From 2001. labor costs in Italy, Greece, Spain and Portugal were 
growing much faster than in Germany. The problem occurred in those countries that 
allowed labor costs to rise faster than productivity. Thus, these countries have lost 
their competitiveness (Nechio, 2011).
Eurozone countries that have a permanent foreign trade surplus, such as Ger-
many, haven’t had to deal with the appreciation of national currency in relation to 
other Eurozone countries. That allowed Germany stable exports, because their prod-
ucts remained cheaper. Thus, the value of German exports to Eurozone countries fell 
in 2012 compared to 2011 because its trading partners were no longer able to obtain 
funds to finance imports, while the value of exports to the rest of the world has grown 
due to the fall of euro against the dollar and other currencies.
Crisis was largely caused by foreign trade deficit. It has been shown that coun-
tries whose public debt exceeds 80% of GDP and have a permanent trade deficit are 
more vulnerable to the crisis.
Loss of confidence in debt of EU countries
Before the beginning of the crisis regulators and banks considered that the 
debts of Eurozone members are safe. Thus, banks held a significant amount of bonds 
of countries with weaker economies that offered low premiums and were equally 
valuable at first glance.
As the crisis evolved, it became obvious that Greek bonds and bonds of some 
other countries were significantly riskier. Loss of confidence is indicated by increase 
of the price of insurance against credit risk, which shows the market expectations 
about credit status of the country.
When investors on financial markets started losing their confidence that some 
countries can repay their debt, the first thing that happens is the increase of inter-
est rates on loans granted to these countries. In line with the view that greater risk is 
associated with greater return, investors want a better return to cover the increase of 
potential losses. Thus, in the end no one is willing to grant loans to such countries. 
(Weill, 2014).
Also, considering the fact that countries which adopted the euro have a limited 
capacity for action in the field of monetary policy, impact of the crisis has become 
considerable, especially in peripheral countries.
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4. MEASURES FOR PREVENTING FUTURE CRISES IN EU
Authors give an overview of following measures for preventing future crises in 
EU: improved debt management, application of Keynesian ideas for overcoming the 
crisis, reform of the criteria for entering the Eurozone, creation of a fiscal union, exit 
of the PIIGS countries from the Eurozone, taxation of the financial sector and crea-
tion of a banking union.
Improved debt management
In his paper Stancu (2013) states that there is a connection between debt manage-
ment, financial instability and crises. Government debt portfolio is usually the largest 
financial portfolio in a country. It often contains complex and risky financial structures 
that can generate a significant risk for the financial stability of the country. Poorly struc-
tured debt, considering its maturity, currency or interest rate is an important factor in 
generating and expanding economic crises in many countries throughout history.
A preferred debt instrument according to Werner (2014) should have the fol-
lowing characteristics: can’t be traded; is cheaper, with lower interest rates compared 
to the yields in the bond market during the crisis; available without rating of credit 
rating agencies; available on domestic market and therefore doesn’t require external 
borrowing, resulting in lower total debt and increased fiscal and financial stability in 
the country and in the whole euro area; creates returns for the domestic banking sec-
tor, enabling growth of capital and reserves; stimulates domestic demand and overall 
economic growth; available without conditions such as austerity measures, sales of 
assets and deflationary structural reforms.
That kind of instrument would be the most attractive source of financing and it 
already exists. It’s a bank loan - the oldest and simplest instrument.
According to improved debt management, governments of the crisis-affected 
countries should immediately stop issuing new government bonds and taking loans 
from International Monetary Fund or World Bank. Instead of that they should sign 
loan agreements with local banks which are able to provide all the necessary funding. 
Banks used to be involved in direct financing of government, which was common 
practice in developing economies. This practice was actively discouraged in the past 
twenty years (Werner, 2014).
The application of Keynesian ideas for overcoming the crisis
The European Union doesn’t generally follow Keynesian ideas for overcoming 
the crisis. The political economy of austerity measures doesn’t provide an adequate 
solution for the peripheral countries. Therefore, a new approach of managing EU 
economy is required (Maris, 2014).
74
REVIEW OF INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS VOLUME 1  |  ISSUE 1  |  2015
In their paper Skilas et al. (2014) state that European leaders forgot they role 
as policy-makers. From the standpoint of Keynesian economics, European Union 
should implement the following measures to prevent further impoverishment of the 
European periphery: 
• The creation of a common European tax system, through which the various 
regional asymmetries and risks could effectively be dispersed. This doesn’t 
mean that state tax systems should be abolished, but that this should have a 
complementary role in achieving a redistribution of growth. The European 
Union should follow the example of the United States, where taxes are im-
posed at the level of federal states, individual states and local governments. 
European tax administration could be formed, similar to IRS4 in USA, which 
would be in charge of collecting taxes.
• Creation of European unemployment benefits. This potential mechanism can 
serve as one of the major official mechanisms of growth redistribution in Eu-
ropean social policy. The US unemployment benefits are essentially a federal 
program that is jointly funded by federal and individual states. This program 
could complement the programs of unemployment insurance in each mem-
ber state.
• Implementation of joint investment projects in European peripheral coun-
tries for more uniform development. However, it doesn’t mean that we should 
ignore the role of European Investment Bank and Social cohesion funds.
• Decentralization of EU institutions. There is no valid reason for current con-
centration of institutions mostly in Brussels and Luxemburg.
• Introduction of surcharges for internal European trade, especially for coun-
tries with large trade surpluses such as Germany. If a surplus of the member 
state exceeds agreed level, that country would have to pay a fee because their 
excessive surplus affects the stability of the European Union. The funds col-
lected from taxes could be invested in member states with deficits.
The reform of the criteria for entering the Eurozone 
Kersan Škabić (2012) in her paper points out that future members of the Euro-
pean Union must, according to the Maastricht Treaty meet certain criteria to be able 
to enter the Eurozone: 
• Price stability - inflation rate measured by the harmonized index of consumer 
prices may vary up to 1.5% of the inflation in three countries with the most 
stable prices.
• The stability of long-term interest rates - long-term interest rates may vary up 
to 2% of the interest rates in the three countries with the most stable prices.
4  Internal Revenue Service.
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• Fiscal discipline - the budget deficit must be less than 3% of GDP, and public 
debt less than 60% of GDP.
• Stability of currency exchange rates - currency fluctuations of EU countries 
and the euro must not be higher than 15%.
The criteria for entering the Eurozone were based on the economic situation of 
the early 1990s so it’s applicability is questionable. Thus, possible reforms of criteria 
are given below:
One option is to replace the current limitation of the inflation rate with a new 
measure based on the inflation of Eurozone.
Another option is to replace the inflation rate measured by the harmonized in-
dex of consumer prices with unit labor costs.
Establishing criterion according to the combination of unit labor costs in euros 
and cumulative five-year changes in relation to the Eurozone average shifts focus on 
the main problem of many economies of the Eurozone which are in crisis.
Stability criterion of long-term interest rates currently has certain technical 
problems. The solution to this problem is to replace the current limit with a median 
interest rate of all Eurozone members. 
Aside from the reform of existing criteria for entering the Eurozone, a new cri-
terion could be introduced - criterion of optimum currency area. Adding a formal 
assessment for meeting the criterion of optimum currency area of the candidate 
countries would contribute to the assessment of their readiness for entering the Eu-
rozone.
Creation of a fiscal union
Fiscal union represents the integration of member states’ fiscal policies. In fis-
cal union, decisions related to tax collection and spending are made by joint institu-
tions of the member states. For example, in the US fiscal policy is determined by the 
central government which has the right to increase taxes, borrow money and spend 
taxpayers’ money.
Monetary union with strong relationships among banking systems, but with-
out fiscal union can cause problems because the governments of member states are 
tempted to borrow too much. In the case of infection by the crisis, it can have serious 
consequences for other countries.
The Eurozone debt crisis is a consequence of the gap between the common 
monetary policy and national economic and fiscal policies of the member states.
Matheron et al. (2012) state that most decisions related to taxation and public 
spending are made at the state level, because fiscal policy is an expression of demo-
cratic sovereignty. Therefore, the European Union has limited fiscal power.
Fiscal union could be formed in two steps. First step would be the formation of 
the European Fiscal Institute, whose main task would be rescuing countries that are 
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in debt crises and creating conditions for the subsequent formation of a federal fiscal 
union and a European treasury. Fiscal Institute could play a role in the implementa-
tion of fiscal union much like the European Monetary Institute had in the imple-
mentation of monetary union. 
In the second phase it would be necessary to start issuing Eurobonds that would 
contribute to obtaining the necessary funds to achieve the recovery plan of the Euro-
pean economy (Sabau Popa, 2012).
The exit of the PIIGS countries from the Eurozone
The biggest benefit for economically powerful countries from the exit of the PI-
IGS countries from Eurozone would be the fact that they would stop giving help to these 
countries - they wouldn’t have to finance their excessive consumption any longer. 
The biggest benefit from leaving the Eurozone for the PIIGS countries would be 
that they would be able to devaluate their currency and could increase the competi-
tiveness of its products (Babić, 2008).
Without its own currency and monetary policy, they aren’t able to increase their 
competitiveness by devaluation. On the other side, devaluation of the national cur-
rency may lead to an increase in inflation and loss of confidence in the currency. Fur-
ther, this would lead to the transfer of deposits from banks in economically weaker 
countries to economically stronger countries.
Therefore, economically weaker countries should, at the same time with the in-
troduction of its own currency, introduce measures to limit the movement of capital, 
such as limiting the withdrawal of deposits (Babić, 2008).
Taxation of the financial sector
Taxation of the financial sector is a current topic imposed by the financial crisis. 
In recent years, many EU countries are considering the introduction of taxes on fi-
nancial capital for various reasons (Bernardi, 2012).
Potential tax in the financial sector could be an important source of government 
revenues. Apart from that, taxing the financial sector is justified because of the fact 
that the financial capital is taxed at a much lesser extent in relation to consumption, 
wages and property. Taxes in financial sector are lower than taxes in other industry 
segments because financial activities are often exempt from value added tax.
Eugenia Ramona (2012) states that an important reason which justifies the taxa-
tion of the financial sector is correcting negative externalities arising from the ac-
tivity of the financial sector, including the effects of excessive risk-taking that can 
prevent future crises.
An important cause of the economic crisis was the lack of regulation and super-
vision of the financial sector. Taxing the financial sector can be used as a measure 
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to regulate this sector without direct intervention. Higher is a tax imposed on toxic 
financial instruments, stronger will be the effect.
Therefore, the taxation of the financial sector can be considered as a measure 
to address the negative externalities generated by the financial sector before, during 
and after the economic crisis.
Creation of a banking union
Banking union is a part of the deepening process of financial integration within 
the EU, and is necessary for finalizing the economic and monetary union.
Difficulties that the banks are facing during the crisis revealed a need for estab-
lishing financial stability and improving the management of the economy in the EU, 
and that includes the creation of a banking union (Howarth and Quaglia, 2013).
Financial stability can’t be achieved at the national level because of the vicious 
circle that has been created between the banks and the government in which shocks 
are transmitted from the government to the banking sector and vice versa, so there is 
a need for stopping this vicious cycle by creating a banking union (Prisecaru, 2014).
Establishing a banking union should be a step in creating a fiscal union that 
would be characterized by high European budget, issuance of euro bonds, creation 
of a coordination mechanism for national budgets and harmonization of tax systems.
5. CONCLUSION
We can distinguish external and internal causes of the contemporary crisis in 
the EU. External causes are bad assessments of the credit rating agencies and high 
managerial compensations in financial sector which led indirectly to financial crisis 
in 2008. that has spread to the whole world.
Internal causes of the crisis in EU are structural imbalance, increasing debts of 
EU countries, foreign trade imbalance among EU countries and loss of confidence in 
debt of EU countries.
The main cause of the crisis in the EU is the way in which the European Union is 
structured. There is a monetary union without fiscal union that should be it’s com-
plement. This created an imbalance and huge differences between powerful member 
countries led by Germany and troubled PIIGS countries. 
Therefore, authors summarize possible measures to overcome this and prevent 
future crises in the EU. The most important of them is formation of a fiscal and bank-
ing union.
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(Footnotes)
1  HICP is an acronym for harmonized index of consumer prices. HICP is an indicator of inflation and 
stability of prices used by European central bank. It is calculated using a methodology which is common to all EU 
member states.
